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From Thaksin=s Social Capitalism to Self-sufficiency Economics in 
Thailand1 
 
 
Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2 
 
Introduction 
More than a decade after the financial crash, which turned into a social crisis, Thailand has now 
entered a new phase of political instability. 19 September 2006, with Prime Minister Thaksin out 
of the country, a faction of Thailand's military led by General Sonthi Boonyaratglin staged the 
18th military coup in the history of the country, suspended the constitution, and declared martial 
law. The coup leaders pledged allegiance to King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who is constitutionally a 
political figurehead but holds great symbolic and actual power through his cultural reverence. 
The day after, the coup leaders received his endorsement. A recent referendum, the country’s 
first ever, has with a small margin and a very low voter turnout voted yes to a new constitution. 
The Economist recently called the result of the referendum “not a vote for the generals” but the 
military strong men have promised that elections will follow by December 2007. 
Most observers agree that it was the royalist-military elite with members of the King’s Privy 
Council who staged the coup. They were no longer able to exert influence behind the scenes as 
they did in pre-Thaksin times. Political instability creates uncertainty. If the election is held 
Thailand’s political agony will have dragged on for two years which has had implications for the 
economy as well. 
 
There are a number of important reasons why Thailand has returned to military rule. Some 
observers have pointed to Thaksin’s involvement in suspect deals, corruption and the 
extrajudicial killings of  more than 2000 criminals and drug dealers and not least the war in the 
Muslim majority southern provinces where more than 2000 have been killed and moving closer 
to civil war (McCargo 2007: 142) . Others say that the coup can be traced back to the financial 
crisis and its impact on a more traditional branch of the Thai elite. The entire economy, including 
the Palace, went into shock as both the financial and real economy imploded. At one point the 
dollar value of baht was halved, all but wiping out the country’s banks and leaving thousand of 
Thai companies’ insolvent. “Blame for the crash could be pinned not on politicians so much as 
on the elite closed circle of top bureaucrats and bankers who had, in the name of tradition and 
culture, rigged the system for themselves” (Handley 2006: 409). Siam Cement and Siam 
Commercial Bank almost went insolvent together with many other companies and most banks 
either controlled by or connected with the Crown Property Bureau (McCargo 2006: 510). The 
IMF initial plans threatened bankruptcy for many of the Kingdom’s elite, by holding them 
responsible for their debts (Handley 2006: 410). Seen in this light the military takeover was an 
attempt by the old royalist elite to regain power and influence over the state and bureaucracy as 
                                            
1Paper to be presented at The Workshop “Autochthoneity or Development? Asian ‘Tigers’ in the World: Ten Years 
after the Crisis” September 19-21, 2007. Organized by The Working Group “Transformations in the World System – 
Comparative Studies of Development” under EADI  (European Association of Development Research and Training 
Institutes), Vienna, ÖFSE (Österreichische Forschungsstiftung für Entwicklungshilfe – the Austrian Foundation for 
Development Research). 
 
2Associate Professor, Research Center on Development and International Relations, Aalborg University, 
Fibigerstraede 2, 9220 Aalborg East, Denmark. Tel. +45 96358404, Fax. +45 98153298. Email. jds@i4.auc.dk, 
Website. www.humsamf.auc.dk/development 
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well as their lost fortunes. 
 
After an interlude between 1998 and 2001 where the pro-Western Chuan Leekpai was in charge 
of a painful restructuring of the economy embraced by the IMF’s austerity programme the 
populist billionaire Thaksin Shinawatra entered the scene as elected prime minister. The Thaksin 
administration used expansionary fiscal policy in an attempt to enhance economic growth. In its 
first term there was a focus on boosting rural incomes and development, but infrastructure 
development was declared the priority for the second term. Whether the new policy orientation in 
reality had any substance is a controversial issue and will be discussed in this paper.  
 
The military coup in September spelled the end for Thaksin. The official explanation that the 
Thaksin family owned shin corp. had sold the telecommunications company Temasek to 
Singapore was just a cover story. Thaksin became a threat to the authority of King Bhumipol and 
the royal old boys network  or the ‘network monarchy’ (McCargo 2005)  not only because he had 
benefited from the post-crisis recovery but also because he directly and indirectly represented a 
new economic policy. After the devaluation and economic crash all Thai TV stations were losing 
money and Thaksin could have launched his own cable-based station for a small sum. Instead, he 
paid Siam Commercial Bank $60 million for the insolvent ITV shares. “With little likelihood of 
ever recovering the investment.” (Handley 2006: 425). Thaksin used his money to buy off the 
palace (Handley 2006: 424). In fact it can be argued that Thaksin directly threatened the 
hegemony of the network monarchy over Thai politics and the illiberal polity in Thailand over 
the past 35 years.3  
 
The intension of this paper is to scrutinize the evolution of economic policy under Thaksin’s 
reign and asks the question whether it was a genuine response to the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and also whether it was a suitable socially oriented policy towards the effects of the IMF’s 
austerity measures. What was rhetoric and what was real politik? Was populism in fact a device 
which hijacked segments of the population in order fulfil Thaksin’s personal fortunes and 
kleptocratic tendencies? The paper focuses on the nationalist social policy in order to understand 
its real intend. It furthermore explores the notion of self-sufficient economics – a term launched 
by Bhumipol as a response to the crisis. The paper is divided into four parts. The first part 
explores recent changes in the global economy which have had an important impact on Thai 
policymaker’ room of manoeuvre and focuses on the sequence from the crisis in 1997, the impact 
                                            
3“The main features of Thailand’s network monarchy from 1980 to 2001 were as follows: the monarch was the 
ultimate arbiter of political decisions in times of crisis; the monarchy was the primary source of national legitimacy; 
the King acted as a didactic commentator on national issues, helping to set the national agenda, especially through 
his annual birthday speeches; the monarch intervened actively in political developments, largely by working through 
proxies such as privy councillors and trusted military figures; and the lead proxy, former army commander and prime 
minister Prem Tinsulanond, helped determine the nature of coalition governments, and monitored the process of 
military and other promotions. At heart, network governance of this kind relied on placing the right people (mainly, 
the right men) in the right jobs. Allocation of key posts was the primary role of the lead proxy, Prem.” (McCargo 
2006: 501). 
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of the Thaksin era on the Thai economy and the implications of the recent military coup d’Etat. 
The second part discusses the new nationalism of the Thaksin administration and the inherent 
contradictions related to its shift in its of privatization. The third part asks whether self-
sufficiency is a possible solution to the stalemate of the Thai political economy. Finally, the 
paper rounds up by pointing to a number of recent events in Thai politics related to both the 
impact of the financial crisis – ten years after – and includes an evaluation of Thaksin’s 
economic policies and some final remarks about sufficiency economics.  
 
Goodbye globalization - hello localization 
There is no general agreement in the literature about the causes of the financial crisis that hit 
Thailand in July 1997 and later on spread to the rest of East Asia, Russia and Brazil (Schmidt 
2000b; Li, Hersh and Schmidt 2001).4 An alternative to both mainstream and more radical 
explanations is related to the downward pressures on the profit rate in the affected countries 
(worst in Thailand, Indonesia and Korea). One of the reasons was that worker militancy 
increased throughout the first half of the decade leading to some of the first sustained wage 
increases in modern Thai history (Glassman 2003: 54). 
 
The crisis itself was essentially the turning point for neoliberal globalization and the end of the 
day of the Washington Consensus (Bello 2003). As noted by two scholars “the glittering 
promises of globalization are turning to ashes all over the worldYCountering this recession is 
likely to require a substantial dismantling of the neo-liberal edifice”(Brecher and Costello 2001). 
As noted by Kasian “Nearly two-thirds of big Thai capitalists went bankrupt, thousands of 
companies folded, and two-thirds of pre-crisis private commercial banks went under and changed 
hands. One million workers lost their jobs and three million more fell below the poverty line” 
Kasian 2006: 23). 
 
It is also well-known that all parties involved made a catastrophic misdiagnosis of the problem. 
The direct intervention of the US Treasury and the IMF forced through an austerity plan 
including budget cuts and sky-high interest rates. In contrast to earlier financial crises, which 
were resolved by banks effectively paying a good share of the bill, it ended with a huge bailout 
of private international investors with tax payers money through public funds.5 
                                            
4In this way globalization is a neoliberal ideology, but also as a concrete challenge and threat, creating 
winners and losers in the international economy. The impact of globalization on Thailand, and the actual 
cause of the crisis, occurred through a number of phases: through foreign investments, pressure from 
multilateral institutions to open up different sectors particularly the finance and the banking system and 
through currency speculation, unregulated short-term capital flows, particularly unregulated portfolio 
investments from hedge funds and pressures on the exchange rate from the revaluation of the Yen and 
the devaluation of the Renminbi which furthermore affect the room of manoeuvre for the execution of 
economic policy. Thus weak supervision of banks and poor state regulation of domestic private financial 
sectors were the results of yearlong pressures from the IMF, the World Bank, unaccountable international 
rating bureaus like Moody's Investor Service who review emerging economies credit ratings, and emerging 
domestic business segments always in search for easy short-term capital for speculative purposes without 
any developmental or domestic considerations. The genesis of the crisis lay in the way the country opened 
its doors to foreign capital. Thailand liberalized by allowing domestic investors access to cheap offshore 
funds through the Bangkok International Banking Facility (BIBF), launched in 1992. But it made the 
mistake of keeping the baht pegged to the US dollar. With no concern about currency devaluation, 
freewheeling Thai speculators borrowed freely and imprudently, without hedging. Actually the crisis was an 
effect of under-regulation rather than of overregulation as the spokesmen of globalization claim (Schmidt 
2002). 
 
5See the informative series of articles by Nicholas D. Kristof and Sheryl WuDunn in New York Times 
February 1 and 17, 1999.
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After an openly discussed plot to install a member of the Royal network as interim prime 
minister (McCargo 2003: 510) the government adopted the IMF-led bailout package ($17.2 
billion) to maintain the liquidity of Thailand’s financial system. The largest source of funds came 
from Japan, reflecting the origin of Thailand’s FDI. The funds were almost exhausted after 
filling the balance-of-payment gap and rebuilding foreign reserves ($15 billion). The austerity 
program aimed to restore external balance, stem capital outflows, stabilize the Thai baht, and 
rebuild investors' confidence. In 1998 the budget saw a 35 percent cut for social services, a 26 
cut for agriculture, and a 27 percent cut for science, technology, energy and the environment 
over the previous years. The IMF together with the World Bank also imposed many restrictions 
as further privatization of health, education and introduced a peculiar blend of private and public 
social welfare. For instance, new fiscal policies were required to have a balanced budget by 
increasing the consumption tax and reducing government spending through a 10% salary cut for 
all public employees. Privatization of public enterprises was also part of the package (Chotigeat 
and Lin 2001). Millions of working poor in Thailand were expected to lose jobs in months ahead 
as the country and the rest of East and Southeast Asia suffered from the worst financial and 
economic crisis in decades. Half of the nation's wealth was concentrated in the hands of the 
richest 10 percent, and income disparity between rich and poor was one of the five sharpest in 
the world (Mydans 15 December: 1997). 
 
Throughout 1997, the government closed down 64 financial companies, leaving 27 and 13 local 
banks operating.6  A new bankruptcy law was introduced in 1998, but in practice the law never 
functioned well. The oversupply in real estate and the nonperforming loans in the financial sector 
had not been sorted out. 
 
In mid-1998, the economy went into a self reinforcing downward spiral and the government 
decided that the austerity program did not accomplish the intended result. With the green light 
from the IMF, it changed policy in favour of deficit spending in order to stimulate demand. Later 
in the beginning of 1999, the Thai government created a special spending package (130 billion 
baht) aimed at jump-starting the stalled economy. Again the loans were financed by Japan 
(Miyasawa Plan) and the World Bank. The package allocated 53 billion baht in new state 
spending to boost export competitiveness, to encourage domestic consumption, to purchase 
goods and services by local government, to create half a million new jobs, and to fund social 
welfare programs. In mid 1999, the third program attempted to cut producer costs, spur new 
investment, and help new homebuyers through 102 billion baht in new tax cuts and spending 
programs (Chotigeat and Lin 2001). Before the crisis, Thailand was running such large budget 
surpluses Athat it was actually starving the economy of much-needed investments in education 
and infrastructure, both essential to growth@ (Stiglitz 2000), now with the crisis it did seem that a 
much needed more pro-active policy was just waiting to be implemented. 
 
However, the economy has slowly recovered over the years to a predicted growth rate of 4 
percent in 2007, but with major problems ahead and a great deal slower than the rest of Southeast 
                                            
6In early 1998, the Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FRA) and Asset Management Corporation (AMC) 
were created to handle the assets of the now defunct financial companies. Since December 1997, more than 2/3 of 
the financial companies and two banks were seized with a book value of 384 billion baht in assets in the form of 
loans, real estate, office equipment, automobiles, etc. By December 1998, the FRA was able to sell only 1/3 of the 
total available lots (15 out of 45 or 41% of the value) represented by an average bid of 37 % of book value. The 
process was very slow and many assets were short of official documents (Chotigeat and Lin 2001). 
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Asia. Although the growth rates have recovered to respectable levels, the lost output of 1998 has 
never recovered (Ito 2007: 19). The year 2001 was characterized by increasing unemployment, 
growing government debt, and non-performing loans. The recession proved more sustained and 
harder to resolve, as present problems are different than when the crisis took off. In 1998, a 
booming US economy created a false hope that it could help pull the Thai economy out of 
recession, while in late 2001 the slumping US economy was a major problem for the strategic 
reliance and dependency on foreign markets. The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington, the SARS epidemic and the bird=s flue disease have made the storm more 
severe. An expected drop in foreign investment also strained Asian economies (Schuman 2001). 
Yet U.S. bankers and economists feared, with good reason that Thailand and other East Asian 
countries, blaming the United States for their woes, would stall on reform. The once rosy picture 
of the ‘East Asian miracle’ painted by foreign investors and the IFIs had turned into a 
contradictory situation where either side blamed each other for choosing the wrong long term 
strategies and short term crisis management policies. 
 
Related to the problem of declining investment there is another important difference between 
pre-crisis and post-crisis management. The increasing competitiveness of China is new threat and 
challenge to cope with for all countries including Thailand. As a matter of fact, roughly 75 
percent of the increase in aggregate GDP among all low-income countries has occurred within 
China in the last 20 years, which poses a tremendous challenge to Southeast Asia.7 Foreign 
investment that once went to countries like Thailand is moving more and more to China. China is 
already drawing 60 per cent of the foreign direct investment made in Asia and this figure is 
expected to rise to 80 per cent after it has joined the WTO. According to Supachai Panitchpakdi, 
who is heading the WTO: AChina should be included in the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA) so 
that the Southeast Asian regional grouping is not left behind when China joins the World Trade 
Organisation,@ and AMembers of Asean should also 'compensate' for China's entry by making 
inroads into the Chinese market before the rest of the world does so,@ he said furthermore. 
AChinese products are very competitive in the United States, we may have to compensate by 
having an early access into markets in China@ (Supachai 2001). 
 
That both internal factors like the falling profit rate and wages rising faster than productivity 
(Bell 2001: 452) and external factors to a very significant degree have been eroding the room of 
manoeuvre of Thai economic policy-making and making the EOI strategy problematic is 
illustrated by various reports which show that the global economy is shrinking for the first time 
in two decades. Economic growth in the US slowed to 1.3% in the first quarter of 2007, the worst 
performance in four years of an overextended debt bubble and it seems in 2007 that the besides 
the twin-deficits problem of the Bush administration it is also embracing a job-less growth 
strategy. “This jobless recovery is still 6.7 million private-sector jobs short of the typical 
recovery 67 months after a previous business-cycle peak” (Liu 2007).Global economic and trade 
growth may slow down this year due to market risks and large trade imbalances, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) said in its 2007 annual report. It seems that Athe riotous progress of 
economic globalization has gone into reverse@ (Brecher and Costello 2001).  
 
The coming global recession coupled with a serious crisis of legitimacy of the very notion of 
American-driven and manipulated neoliberal globalization is a process marked by 
overinvestment in services and industry, leading to overproduction, intense global competition, 
                                            
7See the interview with Joseph Stiglitz in Multinational Monitor, April 2000.
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falling prices, plummeting profits, and consequent downsizings, layoffs, and bankruptcies. These 
conjunctures and new contradictions related to the growing inequalities between and within 
countries lead to a downward spiral of reduced consumer demand, and in the end might lead to 
falling government revenues, and public sector cutbacks. It might also lead to new nationalist 
responses and anti-Americanism not only in East and Southeast Asia but also Sub-Saharan 
Africa and especially noteworthy the Latin-American continent which has turned away from 
U.S. dominance. 
 
One of the results of the crash of the Thai economy and the intervention by the IFIs were that 
several new issues entered the political agenda, which before the crisis were almost non-existing 
or at least controversial in the public debate. Some issues came hand in hand with the bailout of 
the IFIs, others entered the national polity through a number of new agenda setting movements 
and actors especially the powerful entry of the Thaksin government on the scene. The new items 
on the policy agenda were, among others, protectionism, and a shift away from exclusively 
relying on export-orientation (EOI) towards the domestic market; a focus on social policies; and 
in general, a populist and nationalist discourse. Furthermore, domestic and international criticism 
of the IMF and the Washington consensus has escalated in tandem with the unfolding and 
prolonging of the financial crisis. In the words of an >insider=, Aall the IMF did was make East 
Asia’s recession deeper, longer, and harder @(Stiglitz 2000).8 
Besides having earned the label of relying on a populist appeal the TRT dominated government 
also exercised considerable authoritarianism once in office. “The platform was anti-neoliberal in 
certain but not all of its elements and included a national health insurance system and various 
`Keynesian' spending measures to reflate the economy after the economic crisis. The policies 
were popular enough to give TRT repeated, large electoral mandates. TRT received roughly 50% 
or more of the popular vote in 2001, 2005, and again in 2006 usually around twice what any 
other party received, allowing it to act fairly unilaterally and to pull smaller parties into 
coalitions largely on TRT's preferred terms” (Glassman 2007: 2038).. 
Western liberal observers described the new policy of Thaksin in harsh terms. According to the 
New York Times, Thailand is still reeling economically nearly seven years after the devaluation 
of the Bath, turning inward and somehow reluctantly away from export-led growth. Thaksin 
reversed Chuan’s pro neoliberal economic policy by funnelling billions of dollar to banks and 
farmers in order to jump-start the economy and dismissed those like the governor of the Thai 
central bank, with whom he was in disagreement (Landler June 26, 2001). Also the Far Eastern 
Economic Review (FEER) noted ‘the creep towards protectionism is gaining momentum in 
Thailand’. On August 10 2001 they wrote: “the Thai government passed controversial legislation 
limiting foreign ownership of Thai telecommunications companies to 25%. The previous cap was 
49%. The market reacted negatively, dumping telecoms shares across the board as foreign 
investors read the rollback as a signal that Prime Minister Thaksin’s government was moving 
towards a more protectionist posture@ (Crispin November 1, 2001). Other indicators were that in 
the beginning of October 2001, the government said it would spend as much as B30 billion 
(US$673 million) to subsidize local farmers by buying commodities such as rice and rubber at 
above-market prices and it also introduced a universal health-care plan. The government planned 
to spend a record B1.02 trillion in the financial year starting October to spur domestic 
                                            
8The consensus between IMF, the World Bank and the US Treasury Department is based on the ideological 
proposition that the key to success in developing countries are three things: macro stability, liberalization (lowering 
tariff barriers and market deregulation) and privatization.
 
 
 7 
consumption. The Bank of Thailand said it has no immediate plans to lower interest rates, even 
as other Asian countries trimmed rates in line with the US Federal Reserve.  It is low enough to 
support growth. In addition the government decided to start a fund proposed by the previous 
administration and is trying to raise US$250 million from banks, International Finance 
Corporation, World Bank, and private investors for the purchase of local stocks 
(http://aric.adb.org/chronology.asp). All in all it seems that the Thaksin era denoted a deficit 
driven economic policy putting emphasis on the domestic market as a replacement of the past 
decades= search for increasing exports.  
 
Some of the problems Thaksin faced were connected to these varying economic signals but they 
were also related to the mishandling of the bird flu crisis, public outcry over the privatization 
plans of the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and a growing displeasure 
with Acrony capitalism.@ Thaksin it is claimed furthermore mishandled the effects of Tsunami 
catastrophe and not least the problems with the muslim insurgency in the South has been 
mentioned as reasons for his ouster. 
 
With a global economy in shackles, Thailand was essentially left with a choice between 
continuing the  >race-to-the-bottom= strategy it has pursued since the mid 1980s or as we have 
seen at least in rhetoric and  in the election campaigns from the TRT, Thailand might embark on 
a different path of reforms in a >communitarian-third way= direction trying to establish what 
Thaksin termed a >new social partnership= between the state and agents from >civil society=. This 
strategy, which is worrying foreign investors and representatives of the >Washington Consensus= 
involves a particular mixture of populism and nationalism denoting more emphasis on self-
reliance and protection of Thai interests. It is simultaneously the result of and response to a 
social crisis to which there are no easy solutions. 
 
Interestingly the TRT brought along a localist movement engaging various segments of Thai 
society into a participatory democratization process. Although this new trend is merged with and 
is blurred by a blend of new nationalism and monarchism, it is seemingly an attempt to promote 
citizen participation and self-rule, self-reliance and self capacity at the local level (Connors 
2001: 4). In the beginning it was the close relations between the Thaksin government with its 
reformist programme and the NGOs connected with the localist alternative movement which 
created hope among intellectuals who saw this as an emerging new social contract for Thai 
society. For them Thaksin might be able to implement the new progressive constitution from 
1997 and replace what a confidential interview with one leading legal scholar the historical 
stalemate of Thai politics: “The Thai constitution has never been a social contract, never a set of 
rules for those with power to service the people. It has been a set of rules between those with 
power.” (Handley 2006: 408). 
 
It could be seen as a new historic compromise and recomposition of the state while others remain 
more sceptical. A... The legacy of the economic crisis in Thailand may have been to mainstream 
localism, not merely as an ideological cover for ultra-nationalist reaction, but as an integral 
component of a new economic compact. Thaksin, both in words and deed, hints in this direction: 
>perhaps it is only half true that we are following a populist strategy.... But we have ignored the 
bottom half of the economy for a long time. Now we are coming back....=@(Bangkok Post 30 
January 2001 cf Connors 2001: 22). It is interesting to note that Thaksin in a way echoed King 
Bhumipol’s words in accusing foreign investors of exploiting Thailand – even though he himself 
had partnerships with foreign investors – and said that the country should be more self-sufficient 
and independent of the global economy. He also announced a program to help develop village-
based handicraft industries and other self-sufficiency programs (Handley 2006: 425). 
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Whether these statements were a cover for receiving political support and legitimacy or reflect 
true concerns for the local struggle of emerging >civil society= actors or whether the latter was 
simply being used and co-opted by the new government and the World Bank is an open issue. 
However, it seemed that the contours of a new economic and social policy, either as crisis 
management or in a longer perspective as a whole new political and economic strategy, are 
emerging out of the ashes of the crisis.9 This was what some commentators dubbed 
Thaksinomics. On the theoretical level, Thaksin's program combined “elements of demand 
management (Keynesianism), supply side incentives (Reaganomics), entrepreneurial 
development (Schumpeterism), grassroots empowerment (de Sotoism) and the structuralist-non-
price system reorientingCstate led growth of Albert Hirschman.It embraces globalization and 
comparative advantage, while at the same time attempting to shape the country's comparative 
advantage through non-price incentives@ (Looney 2003). 
 
Essentially what has happened before the crisis and before Thaksin took over is what Bienefeld 
(1993: 31) has called Athe disarming of the state.@ Financial deregulation is a route to an 
increasingly polarized society in which the majority suffer sustained welfare losses and in which 
the goal of a more humane, caring and leisure-oriented society will soon be dismissed as utopia. 
 
                                            
9See also the interesting discussions of reforming Thai politics in McCargo (2002). 
It is in this context that after the Asian crisis, the Russian default of 1998 and the collapse of the 
US hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (later on saved by a government bailout!), the 
contagion effect of the global crisis, and the effects of the 11. September attacks, governments 
are preparing emergency plans to remedy >market failures=. In the US, the UK and the rest of the 
EU government money is bailing out everything from airlines to insurance companies and 
medicine has been bought below market prices by the US in Germany - and Athe pressure to 
return to 1970s-style interventionism will be great@ (Preston 1 October, 2001: 32). Subsidies 
have again become the name of the game. After the fall of yet another utopian project - >the 
universal free marketplace=  - the image that all countries following the Western route to 
modernity or what some call globalization - has fallen into pieces. In reality, this image has been 
deformed by a market ideology that is far removed from any human reality... (Gray 24 
September, 2001: 25). 
 
What the Asian crisis subsequently revealed was that the speed of deregulation cannot be 
uniform. It must be adjusted to the special circumstances, politics and even culture of each 
country. The personality of a Central Bank governor might even be significant in determining the 
effectiveness of a deregulated financial system and the movement of free exchange rates 
(McFarlane 2001). What is really new in this context is the call from big business to encourage 
the state to intervene in the economy, and in a number of cases these calls have been extended to 
(re)nationalize ailing industries and credit institutions. Such proposals have been made by such 
varied actors and speculators as J.P. Morgan and various representatives from Thai productive 
capital, but have at the same time been opposed by representatives of both domestic and 
international financial capital. Even the liberal conservative  magazine The Economist suggests 
that A....capitalism as it exists in the West, with safety-nets, public services and moderate 
redistribution bolted on= is a way to have capitalism while not hurting the poor too much@ (Cf 
Hewison 2001a: 10). 
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The basic question is whether the EOI model will be replaced by a new type of interventionist 
state or or a more inward looking state. The new buzzwords Thaksin launched i.e. social 
partnership, a restructured state, and a new social compact signalled a peculiar blend of 
>communitarianism= and a Blairist >Third Way= neo-Keynesianism.10 If Thaksin’s spending 
programmes were a provocation to foreign investors it was even more interesting to note King 
Bhumipol’s interventions after the crisis where he pleaded for self-reliance and the need to 
strengthen traditional and local institutions – family, community, school, village economy, wat – 
in order to have stronger foundations for facing evading globalization (Pasuk 2005; Baker 2005: 
115). However, these initiatives could also be understood as a deflection of responsibilities away 
from the state in terms of delivering social services in the wake of the crisis. In fact the whole 
debate started by the King himself could have been a way to promote privatization of the state 
both directly and indirectly. 
 
The new nationalism, privatization and the contradictions of Thaksin 
 
Although it is now clear that the major causes of the financial crisis were ill advised and non-
sustainable demands of deregulation, privatization and liberalization, the neoliberal pundits have 
not disappeared. At the WTO meeting in Doha in Qatar11 items such as health care, education 
and social policy were debated as suitable for privatization. Also the World Bank and the IMF 
have for three decades advocated commercialization of those collective goods and market 
interests are lining up to invest in user-fees and corporate social welfare. However, it is first and 
foremost privatization and liberalization of public enterprises which is at stake for what some 
vested interests in Washington initially termed Thaksin’s nationalist and populist government. In 
the beginning it committed itself on a social partnership with segments of the NGO sector and 
apparently postponed, foot dragged or at least partly in rhetoric opposed the privatization 
presssures from the IFIs. This peculiar policy contrasts sharply with the domestic demand-driven 
strategy of Thaksinomics which pumped billions of Baht into a whole variety of sectors and 
grand projects. As such the privatization drive was either be a response to external demands or 
and indicator of a growing realization of the relative pick-up in growth rates which seemed to 
stem from utilization of capacity through Keynesian fiscal stimulus (Looney 2003).12 
 
This section of the paper briefly evaluates the background of privatization efforts of state 
enterprises, health care, education and social welfare policies before and after the crisis in order 
to tentatively evaluate whether the new localism cum nationalism of the Thaksin government did 
provide a fundamental shift in policy focus or whether it was new wine in old bottles! 
                                            
10Refering here to the peculiar blend of the post-Thatcher government in England where Tony Blair and Anthony 
Giddens launched a new social contract based on the >Third Way= as a mixture between liberal economics and a state 
with a human face.
 
11While 5th Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which was held in Cancun, Mexico from 
September 10 to 14, 2003 broke down because the developing countries have been bullied, ignored and 
marginalised. Quite simply, walking out was better than the deal on the table.... this was also connected to resistance 
against deregulation and privatization.  
 
12This in accordance with IMF who notes that Aprospects for sustained high growth depend on action to address 
remaining structural weaknesses, especially in the corporate and banking sectors. While enterprises made some 
advances in de-leveraging, their balance sheets remain fragile. Lending activity has gained some steam, but mostly at 
state-owned institutions and resolution of nonperforming loans at private banks continues to be slow." Cf Looney 
2003.    
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Privatization happens for three reasons: 1. the end of political ideological conflict between 
capitalism and socialism; 2. the completed status of welfare state policy and 3. The government’s 
need for funds to support its budget deficits. For developing countries such as Thailand, the 
government's need of money to reduce its current account deficit is a reason for privatization, but 
that is not the main reason. The real blessing comes from getting rid of inefficiencies in the state 
owned enterprises (SOE) services. The reasons and types of privatization of each enterprise 
might not be the same. "Some enterprises are not profit-making firms, but they must exist for 
welfare or for security reasons... The government should find ways for SOEs to be more efficient 
and to be productive" (Pouaree 1997). 
 
Privatisation has had an interesting history in Thailand when taking into consideration that it is 
widely believed that income inequality increased significantly during the 1990s as a result of a 
boom in asset prices and the various privatization and deregulation measures adopted by the 
governments (Ramesh 2000: 22-3). This makes it even more difficult to understand the reaction 
of the Chuan government after the crisis who obviously favoured the increase of private 
participation in the public service and rhetoric aside it seems that Thaksin continued this policy 
with a special blend of favouritism and nepotism while at the same time he claimed to keep 
foreign capital at bay.  
 
In 1998 the Washington Post reported from Bangkok: AHordes of foreign investors are flowing 
back into Thailand, boosting room rates at top Bangkok hotels despite the recession. Foreign 
investors have gone on a $6.7 billion shopping spree this year, snapping up bargain-basement 
steel mills, securities companies, supermarket chains, and other assets. A few pages behind 
stories about layoffs and bankruptcies are large help-wanted ads run by multinational companies. 
General Electric Capital Corp., which increased its stake in Thailand this year through three 
major investments in financing and credit card companies, is seeking hundreds of experts in 
finance and accounting, according to one ad. General Motors Corp. is recruiting aggressively for 
its massive new Thai car assembly plant, scheduled to open in two years@ (Sugawara November 
28, 1998). Nicholas Kristof expanded on this theme in the New York Times: "=This is a crisis, 
but it is also a tremendous opportunity for the US=....=This strengthens the position of American 
companies in Asia.= A clear indication that the Asian crisis would further the American agenda 
came in December, when 102 nations agreed to open their financial markets to foreign 
companies beginning in 1999. It is unclear how the pact will be carried out, but it marks an 
important victory for the US, which excels in banking, insurance and securities. Fundamentally 
that agreement and other changes are coming about because Asian countries, their economies 
gasping, are now less single-minded in their concern about maintaining control. Desperate for 
cash, they are less able to pick and choose, less able to withstand American or monetary fund 
demands that they open up@ (Kristof February 1, 1999). 
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It is not unimportant to bring in Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction as the crisis also 
created winners. The surviving companies became in some cases stronger than before the crisis. 
Many of their competitors had disappeared making space for new leaders especially in the 
service sector where there were and still are close connections with the military, bureaucracy and 
the political level in general (Baker 2005: 113). Typically, the survivors were those who had 
made their billions through monopolistic concessions on the domestic telecoms market and who 
took the initiative to establish a new political part the TRT to protect and promote their own 
interests (Kasian 2006: 24). Thaksin´s view of political power and the state was based on his 
own experience in receiving lucrative contracts and state concessions in telecommunications, TV 
networks, mobile phones and fixed-line telephones and satellite operations. 
 
However, before Thaksin came to power, the Chuan led government had been under pressure 
from the IMF and was forced to scrap a regulation that limited foreign corporations to a 25 
percent stake in Thai financial companies. Citibank signed a memorandum of understanding on 
the purchase of a major Thai bank - First Bangkok City Bank. As mentioned above, Athe crisis 
resulted in a massive restructuring of ownership and control in the economy. Devaluation meant 
the end of many businesses, with hundreds closing in all sectors. This saw a transfer of 
ownership to Japanese, American and European investors through debt-for-equity swaps, 
investment in devalued companies, and buy-outs of Thai partners@, but Aas the government took 
over four struggling banks and closed many finance companies, one-third of the financial 
sector’s companies were gone by the end of 1998." AAt the end of 1999, the total state investment 
in the banks alone was US$ 12 billion or about 10 percent of GDP.... The bailout of the financial 
sector means that every taxpayer will be footing the bill for at least a generation@ (Hewison 
2001d: 9, 10 & 13). 
 
During boom times before the crisis, the SET was worth 3.5 trillion baht, but its capitalisation 
has since been eroded to less than half that figure reflecting the onslaught of whole sectors and 
companies. Many Thais feared losing control over domestic business if foreign capital gets to 
much influence and it was this sentiment the Thaksin government tried to exploit in its attempts 
to endorse domestic interests and jump-start the domestic market.13 
 
The Thaksin government had originally pledged to raise the market capitalisation of the 
moribund Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET) by about 700 billion baht by listing 14 state 
companies in the next two years. Profitable monopolies such as the Telephone Organisation of 
Thailand (TOT) and the Communications Authority of Thailand (CAT) were due to be sold in 
2002. However, due to political in fight, strikes by workers and protests from NGO´s and the 
seriousness of non-performing loans the government scheduled that “only” 16 state enterprises 
should be privatized. 
 
Jayasankar Shivakumar, the former country director of the World Bank in Thailand said already 
in 2001 that ‘the status quo is risky to Thailand's future economic health’. "If power is not 
competitive, then the country will not be competitive. If the aim is to reduce tariffs, improve 
efficiencies and alleviate government debts, then there really is no other option than 
privatization" (Crispin 2001). Illustrating the interests of foreign investors and neoliberal 
ideology, FEER noted that, privatization of Thailand's rigid state enterprises was always going to 
be a tricky business, requiring hard-nosed political choices. And with the economy slipping 
again, those choices have become ever more urgent. Unfortunately, the efforts seemed to 
                                            
13http://business-times.asia1.com.sg/views/story/0,2276,28895,00.html? 
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resemble >business as usual= (Crispin  2001). Other observers claimed that A.... Throughout Asia a 
post-Washington Consensus outlook is emerging which stresses that markets can fail - especially 
financial markets and markets for technology - and that governments should intervene to 
promote domestic competition, regulate financial transactions, promote education and stimulate 
the inward transfer of technology. This particular view of government intervention has become 
one of the key elements of Thaksinomics@ (Looney 2003). In fact, Thaksin did the opposite. He 
applied what Kasian terms ‘crony capitalist-oriented globalization’ very much in line with his 
predecessors. Thaksin’s privatization drive was indeed ambitious as it involved energy, water, 
transportation, telecoms “providing billion-baht pickings for his cronies, with some showy 
infrastructural projets and a scattering of crumbs to his electoral base in the villages: micro-
loans, farmers’ debt relief, a reduced charge of 30 baht (around 75 cents) per hospital visit” 
(Kasian 2006: 27). 
 
This is questionable because acceleration of public sector reforms and structural adjustment, an 
outcome of externally negotiated crisis-management programs before Thaksin, comprises a 
further dimension of the social impact of the crisis.14 >One that might be exacerbated by 
increasing employment dualism and inequality due to more labor market deregulation. A move 
which would increase wage flexibility by relaxing minimum wage provisions and amending the 
recently enacted Labor Protection Act of 1998. As mentioned above, privatization has been 
interpreted by labor as a perceived threat to pay levels, benefits, and job security, was given a 
legal basis under a new State Enterprise Corporatisation Bill. The latest move in accordance to 
World Bank conditionalities was to privatize EGAT. AIMF-negotiated austerity budgets, high 
interest rate policies, and reduced public service subsidies have comprised additional policy-
mediated privations= (Deyo 2000). 
 
Before Thaksin entered the scene it is interesting to note that Alabour unions initiated strikes and 
demonstrations have centred on a few core issues: extension of social security protection, job 
security, maintenance of pay and bonuses, labor standards (especially health and safety), 
severance pay, and, among SOE workers, continued opposition to privatization. Building on 
earlier efforts to extend social security benefits and coverage, workers and unions have mounted 
periodic public demonstrations and appeals for minimum severance compensation and extension 
of maternity, health, and other benefits for laid-off workers. Similarly, unions have increased 
efforts to mobilize Thai workers and international groups and agencies in support of a proposal 
to establish a tripartite institute to monitor work health and safety standards. Similarly, SOE 
workers have fought hard to slow or reverse the privatization process@ (Deyo 2000). 
AThe policy outcomes of labor protest in these and other areas have been mixed. On the one 
hand, despite a continued ban on formal unionization in the public sector, SOE workers, now 
organized in >associations,= succeeded in defeating a Ministry of Finance proposal to cut public 
sector pay levels by 30%, as well as in obtaining government commitment, at least in principle, 
to redirect a portion of any proceeds from privatization to worker education, job retraining, and 
family welfare@ (Deyo 2000). While the EGAT privatization dispute is not yet solved there are 
other strikes as Deyo which ended with mixed results for the workers involved. 
Turning to the private sector strongly unionized workers possessing superior education or skills 
have enjoyed a strong bargaining position at corporate and policy levels in matters directly 
affecting employment, training possibilities as well social benefits. AWorkers in the well-
organized banking sector, for example, obtained an agreement from the Ministry of Labor and 
                                            
14For this and the following see Fred Deyo (2000). 
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Social Welfare to assist retrenched bank workers and to offer these workers a ten-month salary 
replacement. And private sector unions played a key role in pushing through improved severance 
pay legislation under the newly enacted Labor Protection Act noted earlier@ (Deyo 2000). This 
was in sharp contrast to the advice from the IMF who said: “Without a capacity for monitoring 
and discerning where the most acute problems are, countries risk devoting scarce budgetary 
resources to safety net policy that is not targeted  efficiently to those most in need in a specific 
crisis situation. (IMF deputy director Peter Heller cf Assavanond and Achayakachart 1999). 
 
The current debate on privatization is encapsulated by a noticeable shift in government strategy, 
and can be interpreted as being based on both nationalism and populism. As such its focus on the 
local is a conscious and oppotitional response to neoliberal globalization. As Hewison notes, Athe 
nationalism of the localists is politically conservative, while the localist visison is a romantic 
construction of an imagined past.@ They furthermore A... reject industrialization as a development 
strategy, seeing industry as a cause of exploitation and of the degradation of the environment@ 
(2001c: 13 &15). At least in a short term perspective it seems that, the new economic policy of 
Thaksin would be based on a more regulatory role for the state. 
 
Turning now to social policy and the role of the health sector, the past two decades, have seen 
powerful international trends in market-oriented health sector reforms being swept around the 
world, especially from the North to the South. Introduction of user fees for public services has 
become entrenched in many developing countries. The World Bank strategy has been powerfully 
reinforced by the practice of making user fees a condition of loans and aid from the IFIs 
(Whitehead, Dahigren and Evans 2001). 
 
The privatization policies of the IFIs for instance in health care are highly regressive, because 
pooling of risk is reduced and care costs fall more directly on the sick (who are most likely to 
poor, children or elderly) than on healthy individuals and the result is a medical poverty trap 
consisting of ARises of out-of-pocket costs for public and private health-care services are driving 
many families into poverty@ (Whitehead, Dahigren and Evans 2001). 
 
This was also the case in Thailand although there are government-funded insurance policies for 
civil servants out-of-pocket expenses continue to be the primary source of funding for health 
services, accounting for 65.4 percent of the funding. The private sector continues to dominate the 
health sector by its stake of 67 percent of total health expenditures which is equal to 4.1 percent 
of GDP (government components are 33 percent of total and 1.9 of GDP). Private hospitals are 
growing at an estimated rate of about 12-15 percent each year and may soon become the major 
provider (Ramesh 2000: 101).15  
 
In Thailand, poor people pay proportionally more for health care than rich people. Although the 
number varies according to statistics and sources, and the dubious fact that the World Bank has 
changed its definition of poor, the Bank’s own figure is more than seven million people are 
below the poverty line of US$ 1.50 per day (Hewison 2001b: 14). The IFI´s and ADB=s directive 
to privatize health care is opposed by representatives of Thailand=s huge HIV-aids infected 
                                            
15Interestingly, one of the first short-term initiatives taken by the Thaksin government was Aa special spending 
package set up for retired civil servants. Under this program the government would pay an amount equivalent to 30 
times salary to the families of civil servants who pass away.  “A new ruling permits retired civil servants to spend 
half of that amount before their death. It is estimated that the total amount of spending power created from this 
initiative would be roughly 45 billion baht.@ (Looney 2003)  
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community, as an estimated 800,000 of whom survive with state medical aid. Recently several 
hundred Aids patients joined protests at the ADB meeting in Chiang Mai, forming a so-called 
>living cemetery= to bring public attention to their plight (Z-Net). To put those numbers into 
perspective, Thai society is full of contrasts and contradictions. In Bangkok, the number of non-
Thais checking in for treatment at the leading private hospital, Bumrungrad, has increased 
fourfold since 1996. This year, the figure will top 170,000. And Malaysian and Thai hospital 
operators want even more (Cheng 2001). In fact, there is evidence that user charges promote 
inequity by discouraging the poor, but not the well-off from seeking health care and to make 
matters even worse Acombining insurance financing with private provision is one of the surest 
ways to escalating costs@ (WHO 1993 cf Ramesh 2000: 84 and 101). 
 
As a response to these inequities and the fact that more than 3 million people fell below the 
poverty line and also as a way to boost the rural vote Thaksin a debt moratorium for the rural 
poor, a revolving fund of 1 million baht per village, and a 30 baht-per-visit scheme of health care 
(Baker 2005: 120). But in fact and despite all the populist overtones Thaksin had no strategy to 
empower farmers or change their structural position (Baker 2005: 129)…. 
  
Despite its new universal low-cost health care plan it is not clear whether the Thaksin 
government really wanted to continue the privatization drive or make health a collective good. 
Critics came from many quarters as his 30 baht per hospital visit was a welcome improvement – 
although very modest indeed, “but it was hastily implemented, poorly managed and under 
funded, resulting in overworked and demoralized medical staff and near bankruptcy at many 
rural hospitals (Kasian 2006: 27). What is clear though is that there is an increasing demand for 
better and cheaper health services. Currently, Thailand's health systems are facing a financial 
crisis, demographic and epidemiological transition, and an increasing demand for more and 
costlier services which marks the urgency of a health reform in the nearest future. 
 
Turning to the contested role of education which still belongs under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) whose latest  round took place in February 2000 it is well-known that 
the U.S., British, Australian and Canadian administrations want to privatize university education 
and adult training. As mentioned above, the beginning of the 1980s saw the launching of a 
massive strategy on the part of the IFIs to pressurize the developing countries and to force them 
to drastically cut state spending on health, welfare and education. Paradoxically, the World Bank 
recently came to the conclusion that educational levels in the Third World had reached mediocre 
levels, but concluded Athat those countries which are willing to adopt legislative and regulatory 
frameworks for higher education ... in which the private sector has a greater involvement in 
teaching and finance, will continue to receive priority (World Bank 1995 cf Kalaftidès). 
 
Even before the onset of the crisis in 1996, the Thai government began to offer various tax 
incentives and loans at low interest rates to encourage the establishment new private schools; 
likewise the government has been encouraging foreign universities to set up branch campuses in 
Thailand. This was in response to the demands of the private sector Abut even with the rapid 
gearing up of secondary education, by the year 2000 over 70 percent of the workforce would still 
have no more than six years of primary education@ (Phongpaicit and Baker 1998: 149). 
 
This is also why the World Bank advertises that the investment outlook for private education in 
Thailand is very good. According to the World Bank, Athere is a vigorous private education 
sector, which has already made significant inroads into the education market, and which is poised 
for further expansion, particularly in the vocational area. Private pre-primary schools account for 
about 20% of children enrolled, while about 12% of primary schools are privately operated. The 
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private sector accounts for about 6% of the total number of lower secondary, and 23% of upper 
secondary schools. Moreover, nearly 50% of students are in private education at the vocational 
level, and significant numbers are also in higher academic education. The Thai government is 
already seeking foreign loans to support public education. Allowing foreign investment in private 
education to continue and to increase, but on more favourable terms to the international suppliers, 
is an increasingly probable development. There are examples of private, for-profit, companies 
that have already succeeded in obtaining licenses to operate universities and colleges, and it is 
interesting to take notice of Thailand=s recent relaxation of some of the rules for education 
investment. Private education institutions are now permitted to have tax exemption of their 
operational profit and the owners of a private university are entitled to retain for themselves 15% 
of income. Moreover, once an institution has obtained a license to establish a higher education 
unit, it is allowed freedom in organization and management@.16. There is no doubt that in recent 
years the trend towards privatization of education has increased, particularly but not exclusively 
in higher education (Ramesh 2000: chp.5), which is awkward when taking into consideration that 
the public educational system historically and contemporarily has been considered by Athe ruling 
class as an instrument for promoting national integration and for propagating the subject’s 
morality and virtues@ (Bechstedt 1991: 303). 
 
Marketization and privatization of education threatens to exacerbate not only the disparities 
between schools in terms of educational outcomes but also the existing social inequalities 
(Ramesh 2000: 143). The privatization drive and its concomitant passenger growing unevenness 
and inequality has been part and parcel of most governments in Thailand in recent times. This is 
also why it is important to stress that there are no signs whatsoever that the new Thaksin 
government wants to reverse these trends as the number of public enterprises privatized including 
education are steadily increasing. Although spend about one-fifth of the national budget on 
education still three quarters of the labor force possess only primary education and “persons with 
primary education or below suffered the greatest effects on both employment and real income. It 
is clear that the economic crisis adversely impacted the unskilled labour force most severely” 
(Sirilaksana 2005: 269). It is further interesting to note that it is only basic education which is 
free, much like health-care where such items as elective surgery are usually not considered a 
basic need.  The new education act which was promulgated under Thaksin calls for more private 
sector involvement in education at all levels and charging cost-based user fees (Sirilaksana 2005: 
281-282). 
 
The question about social protection has for a decade or so been debated in the Thai political 
context. This endeavour has been an achievement of the labor movement, which although weak 
on paper has managed to pressurize the authorities on this important issue. In connection with 
this trend, the  international pressure and the present period of democratic opening has brought 
about an embryonic demise of the legitimacy of state-sponsored and employer-dominated labour 
unions with a  re-emergence of independent, representative organizations characterized  by  
growing  militancy (Lambert and Caspersz 1995: 572/580/583). This is also the result of the 
activities of several international organizations such as the AAFLI, ICFTU, and ILO who for 
years have lobbied Western countries to impose trade sanctions in retaliation for the general 
disbanding of unions and ban on strikes and other government induced industrial actions. There 
is no doubt that labour welfare campaigns and common strategies aimed at the establishment of 
social security systems and other solidarity measures have been increasing, not only in Thailand, 
but throughout the Southeast Asian region (Brown and Frenkel 1995: 82-106). 
 
                                            
16http://www1.worldbank.org/edinvest 
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The militancy has also been directed against the contractionary monetary and fiscal policies of 
the IFIs which induce recessionary pressures, corporate closures, lower or negative growth rates, 
retrenchments and higher unemployment. Cutbacks in government expenditure lead to reduced 
spending on education, health and other services. The switch in financing and provision of 
services from a grant basis to user-pay basis impacts negatively on the poorer sections of society. 
 The removal or reduction of government subsidies jacks up the cost of living including the cost 
of transport, food, and fuel.  These and other policies have contributed to higher poverty, 
unemployment, income loss and reduced access to essential goods and services.  It is not a 
coincidence that countries undergoing IMF conditionality have been affected by demonstrations 
and riots (popularly called "IMF Riots"). The social impact of IMF policies is another major 
cause of the crisis of credibility in IMF conditionality (Khor 2001). 
 
Despite Thaksin’s attempt to corporatize (Pasuk and Baker 2004: 120) privatization was strongly 
opposed by unions and activist groups and spelled real trouble. The real problem for Thaksin was 
that when it comes to the actual level of ‘real-politik’ his real intentions and policy were expose 
after his announcement of the “The Kingdom of Thailand Modernization Framework - KTMF”. 
It was essentially an even more radical version of IMF conditionalities in any country so far and 
could have been worked out in Washington DC.  KTMF was announced in a speech by Thaksin 
for foreign investors in Bangkok 26 January 2006.  
 
It opened a wide variety of state assets and function – utilities, transport, natural resources, 
telecoms, IT, national security and intelligence, agriculture, culture, public health, medical 
services – “to open bidding by foreign investors in partnership with the state” (Kasian 2006: 34 
and http://www.boi.go.th/english/how/speeches_detail.asp?id=240). This was the real face of 
Thaksin and “a logical extension of Thaksinomics. If Thailand is a company as much as a 
country, why should it not act just like a multinational holding company or hedge fund, buying 
up properties in the international marketplace” (Pasuk and Baker 2004: 246).  These initiatives 
showed that Thaksin had serious trouble in to differentiate between his own interests and the 
country’s interests and they were probably another reason why important intellectuals, academics 
and labor leaders supported his ouster. 
 
It seems that Thaksin became an offer for his own greed. In fact, he ignored social policy as an 
ingredient of labor’s struggle to obtain rights and entitlements. After the crisis and on the 
initiative of the ILO a Thai tripartite mechanism was established; however it soon turned out that 
at the root of what may be described as a weak basis for tripartism are the continued constraints 
on freedom of association. In fact, the credibility of the officially sanctioned and legally 
recognized national trade union centre is very much eroded now and workers with grievances, 
including members of the official unions, are increasingly looking elsewhere for representation. 
Since recent initiatives to develop independent and democratic trade unions have been 
constrained by government repression, workers= organizations are forced to operate beyond the 
ambit of the law, and often clandestinely, are generally unable to effectively and openly criticize 
government policies and programmes (ILO 1998 cf Schmidt 2002). Although labour 
comparatively speaking is weak and not very well organized it was as mentioned above 
nevertheless a major force behind the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1990. 
 
Evidence shows that because of the very low state schemes for improving the income and welfare 
of employees to catch up with inflation, Thai workers=demands initially concentrated on wage 
increases. But this pattern has been changing. This is clear from the fact that Amajor issues of 
labour disputes from 1987 to 1989 concerned welfare (33 per cent) wages (20 per cent) 
conditions of employment (18 per cent) and other issues (29 per cent)" (Piriyarangsan and 
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Poonpanich 1994: 241).  The struggle to obtain social security protection in Thailand dates back 
to the 1950s, but in the late 1980s renewed pressure through public demonstrations and 
campaigns from the Labor Congress and Trade Union Congress resulted in the promulgation of 
the Social Security Act of 1990 (Brown and Frenkel 1995: 104). The first phase was 
implemented in 1992 and covers health insurance, maternity benefit, disability benefit and death 
benefit. The scheme is financed by employers, employees and the government each paying 1.5 
percent of wages as contributions, but there is serious debate about the second phase (Asher 
1995: 16).  
 
On several occasions the IMF has interfered in the Thai domestic debate with regard to social 
policy by either directly or indirectly threatening officials and government representatives. For 
instance, in 1998 the Labour and Social Welfare Ministry planned to expand protection for 
retirees and dependents (children of retirees) by proclaiming publicly that this part of the 
population represents basic social welfare deserving state support. According to the IMF such a 
move would be in conflict with international practices and could become a costly burden in the 
future and A...that protecting retirees and children should be left to the private savings scheme and 
was outside the responsibility of the government. According to various sources at least six 
million households would qualify for state assistance, either through the fund or from other 
government run programmes@ (Sirithaveeporn 1998).  Already in August 1997 one month after 
the crisis hit the country, the government tried to avoid contributing to the Social Security Act 
which requires employees and employers each to contribute 1.5 percent of monthly wages of 
employees to the Social Security Fund. AThai Trade Union Congress secretary-general Pratueng 
Saensang said the government has an obligation to contribute to the social security fund. But it 
failed to make the seven-billion-baht contribution in April, citing economic and financial 
difficulties@. This violated the rights of workers, and the TTUC threatened to sue the Social 
Security Office, but representatives of the government left the question to the tripartite committee 
to decide (Unarat 1997). 
 
The policy of the IFIs has been to promote the establishment of adjustment-related temporary 
social safety nets known as Social Funds (SFs). AThe aim has been to offset the negative social 
impact of policy reform. SFs are increasingly conceived as an intermediate and long-term 
delivery instrument which is more efficient than traditional means of service delivery through 
established ministries, through their employment of an ostensibly more participatory, 
decentralized, and >demand-responsive= approach. In this connection they have been seen as 
everything from a >beachhead= for the modernization of the state (through the >demonstration 
effect= they have on ineffectual state bureaucracies) to a >training ground in the democratic 
process=@ (Cornia and Reddy 2001: 11). Various components of the World Banks Social 
Investment packages have contributed to Thai NGOs and >civil society= actors, as well as also 
provided assistance to the poor to cover health and education expenditures. 
 
An editorial from the leading newspaper Matichon said that the Chuan government risked losing 
support if its focus didn’t change from the financial sector to the poor and underprivileged and 
that the trickle-down policy had not improved the livelihoods of the ordinary people and that 
more power should be transferred to the Social Policy Committee (Matichon cf Bangkok Post 
August 27, 1997). Also the middle class discovered than in many cases they lost everything. This 
created a “traumatic relavation of their insecurity …. [which] … nourished a new culture of 
mutual indifference … individual struggles to adapt to the crisis, they could not but turn their 
faces away and pretend not to see other people’s suffering…. The result was a sharp decrease in 
collective action for mutual protection, and hence a severe weakening of civil society” (Kasian 
2006: 24). 
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The official view of the Thai government on social policy was to boost the capabilities of 
families and communities in order to help them achieve greater self-reliance and to support 
individual development which is very much in compliance with the Thaksin government’s goal 
of enhancing social partnership. These echoes the Thai elite’s ethos which is well encapsulated 
by its tendency to reduce complex social problems to, for instance, Afamily breakdown@ as a code 
for bad society which only a government with Avalues@ could fix. One politician suggested that 
Awe believe that with a warm and healthy family, every social problem - drugs, street children, 
child exploitation, and prostitutes will be solved@ (Assavanonda 2000).  
 
Whether the goal of Thaksin was to attain equity or not is still to early to judge, but social 
welfare policies have so far been based on neoliberal thinking while economic policy has 
changed into a more nationalistic and protectionist direction. His emphasis on self-reliance, 
family and community mutual care, voluntary charity, and philanthropic initiatives and this is 
where the alliance between NGOs and the new government made sense in the beginning in a 
country where in the aftermath of the crisis there was a significant a transfer of wealth from the 
poor to the already rich. In this way Thaksin’s populist social policy became his own zenith as it 
turned against him in the end. In fact regional and income disparities continued to worsen under 
Thaksin and poverty has increased (Kasian 2006 and NESDB 2007). 
 
The Thaksin government was in the beginning squeezed between the demands and 
conditionalities of the IFIs, and an increasingly vocal popular protest movement against foreign 
influence. This situation is illustrated by the fact that according to the World Bank,17 the social 
impact of the crisis has been that 1) labor markets have worked well to cushion the effects of the 
crisis, but as Hewison notes  when translated it means Athat markets worked in spreading out the 
impact more evenly among workers. That is people were able to be laid-off easily. Because there 
was only a minimal social security system laid-off workers then went in search of other jobs. 
While they did this, family savings supported them. Family savings were depleted in this process. 
This implicated most heavily on the already poor;@ 2) the ‘World Bank recommends that social 
safety net expenditures be reduced by more than 16 percent. Part of the reason for recommending 
reduced expenditures was the view that based on 1994 data; the Bank argued that only about 6 
percent of government expenditure benefited the poor, while 25 percent concentrated on the 
rich.’  3) Again according to the Bank, the poor used their discretionary resources and savings on 
health and education, which means that Aas the wealthy´s >discretionary= expenditures were more 
substantial, the impact on their wealth was relatively less;@ 4) Finally, the Bank acknowledged 
that >traditional mechanisms= of community-based support have broken down, and in contrast to 
its conclusion mentioned above, it recommended an increase in unionisation. It seems that 
Thaksin’s and big business “main motivation for redrawing the social contract was to stem the 
rising tide of political dissent. Social policies were simply a ‘cushion’ to protect profit making” 
(Baker 2005: 132). 
It is still to early to judge whether the opposition which emerged against Thaksin was 
manipulated by the Royal network or whether there was a genuine majority for instance in 
Bangkok who disliked Keynesian spending measures or it was corruption to crucially royalists in 
the military and elsewhere who resisted Thaksin's increasing encroachments on to their economic 
and political interests spheres. Indeed Thaksin stressed in his weekly radio broadcast of February 
4th: “The only person who can tell me to quit is His Majesty the King. If his Majesty whispers to 
                                            
17The following is based on Hewison (2001b: 17-18).
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me, “Thaksin, please leave”, I’ll go” (Cf Kasian 2006: p fn3). What can be discerned is that the 
accusations against Thaksin for usurping the monarch’s role (Kasian 2006: 7), and parts of the 
military with “support from state enterprise workers disgruntled at Thaksin's support for 
privatisation engaged in repeated street demonstrations throughout 2006, calling for Thaksin's 
resignation because of his tax-free (but possibly legal) sale of his company to Singapore's 
Temasek. The military, and the networks of royalists of which they are part, finally took action 
on their own in September, deposing Thaksin before he could reshuffle the military or win 
another electoral mandate” (Glassman 2007: 2038-2039). These developments point in the 
direction a classical inter-elite power game and a clash of interests at the highest level concerning 
state concessions, patronage and corrupt deals. Those who are in power are also the ones who get 
the biggest slice of the pie. The royal network itself also consist of different ideologies and 
political orientations – some in a liberal direction and others in much more conservative form, 
but they all rely on an almost cult type of worship of Bhumipol which makes the stakes for 
succession even more dangerous (McCargo 2007: 142 and 144). The royal network did not want 
“Thaksin in a position to exert influence on the passing of the Chakri dynasty mantle to Crown 
Prince Vajiralongkorn” (Handley 2006b). 
Sufficiency economics 
The military-appointed government, led by the retired general, Surayud Chulanont, relaunched 
the idea of a "sufficiency" model for managing the economy. Although in theory this concept 
centres on moderate consumption, sustainable investment and the bolstering of the economy's 
resilience to external shocks, it remains unclear how it will be implemented. Moreover, there is 
no certainty that the next government will continue with this policy approach and it is a also 
highly contested approach in terms of its many meanings and interpretations from radicalism, 
Buddhist economics to mainstream. Even the business community and specific companies seems 
to have high jacked the term “for political and business gains” (Pasuk 2005: 178).  
In December 1997 shortly after the crisis had struck the country King Bhumibol used his 
birthday speech to say, in essence “I told you so.” He attacked political leaders for having taken 
Thailand along the path of unbridled capitalism and consumerism. Had people embraced his own 
ideas of a simpler society, he suggested the crisis would have been avoided. …. He hit out at the 
kind of modern global market capitalism that had overwhelmed his ideal of a humble, dhamma-
guided kingdom (Handley 2006: 414). It was greed, which Bhumipol suggested came with the 
orthodox capitalism preached by the IMF, that was the root of the crisis. The crash could have 
been avoided if the country had practiced his own economic philosophy.” I have often said …. 
That to become a tiger [economy] is not important. A self-supporting economy means to have 
enough to survive … Each village or each district must have relative self-sufficiency. Things that 
are produced in surplus can be sold, but must be sold in the same region.” …..chasing world 
markets with surplus production don’t benefit the producers, and only leads to suffering” 
(Handley 2006:  414). Both the Thai Army and especially the Ministry of Education allocated a 
substantial part of its budget to educate own personnel and also for direct funding of programmes 
to “promote self-sufficiency and self-reliance to counter the impact of the economic crisis” 
(Pasuk 2005: 162). 
Sometimes the king himself has called it ‘the new theory’. It is built around a conception of rustic 
self-sufficiency: ‘enough to live on and enough to eat.’ Oddly, its proponents use the same 
language that has made Bhutan’s ‘Gross National Happiness’ a famous countercultural 
exoticism. Anybody who has recently passed through Bangkok will see the immediate 
disjuncture between modern Thailand and this royal ideology. However, the King’s endorsement 
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of localism could also be seen as “an attempt to preserve old social bases of power” (Baker 2005: 
108).  As one illustration, the newest mega-mall, the ostentatious £230 million Siam Paragon in 
central Bangkok, is even built on land leased from the Crown Property Bureau. Regardless of the 
many contradictions, before the coup the theory of ‘sufficiency economy’ was of largely 
academic interest. It was rhetorically significant but lacked any serious grounding in government 
policy.  Now with a royally-aligned, palace-supported military leadership in charge, the 
implementation of the King’s economic ideas has full government backing (Farrely 2007). 
Sufficiency economics were invented by Bhumipol during Cold War and the communist 
insurgency in the North. In a number of speeches he explained “that the center of his view was 
the modern maxim promoted by King Vajiravudh: every citizen’s paramount duty is to the unity 
of the nation under the king” (Handley 2006: 200). In the same vein he noted that part of the 
problem of Thailand’s lack of unity was selfish capitalism, which lacked morality and was by 
nature divisive. Capitalism didn’t reward most the hardest workers or those who performed their 
duty. It benefited more those who took advantage of others, and this eroded unity. Bhumipol said 
trader and land speculators who took advantage of peasants “may be on side of terrorists.” 
(Handley 2006: 200). He further noted that rural development should be carried out with a high 
degree of ability, wisdom and intelligence coupled with honesty without any thought of financial 
gains (Handley 2006: 200). He concluded that modern government had been imported from the 
West and was not appropriate to Thais (Handley 2006: 201).  ….. a non-dhamma concept …. 
Hard work was introduced as having merit in itself (Handley 2006: 202). 
 
These remarks are reflected in the Tenth National Economic and Social Development Plan  
(2007-2011) which have set the target of reducing poverty from 13 percent in 2004 to 4 percent 
by 2011. It also targets the ratio of the richest quintile to the poorest quintile to be no more than 
10 times. Very much inspired by Bhumipol’s self-sufficiency approach the development plan 
also emphasised implementation of the “Good Living and Happiness Society Strategy” which 
consists of five development plans: (i) sufficiency economy plan aimed at building up knowledge 
and creating occupational skills; (ii) community development and opportunity creation plan 
focusing on reducing household expenditures (e.g. use of organic fertilizer and vegetable home 
gardening) and creating market opportunities for community products; (iii) rehabilitation plan for 
natural resource; (iv) vulnerable people and senior citizen assistance plan; and (v) provision plan 
for basic services (e.g. health, education, and vocational training). The plans will be implemented 
through projects jointly designed and implemented by the community leaders, local governments, 
provincial governments and central government (World Bank 2007). 
 
Thaksin had also used the concept in a strategic way to pursue his populist spending programmes 
in the sense that his support to local initiatives was a way to exploit rural dissidence, protest 
which evolved into a rural movement but once he came into power he exposed his lack of interest 
in the rural and local cause. His main strategy for rural change was “to pump in capital funds. He 
had no interest in land reform, land-to-the-tiller programmes, tax reforms, or other policies to 
shift the structural position of peasants within the national economy (Baker 2005: 132). One need 
to be reminded that 70 per cent of the population lives in the countryside and more than 500,000 
farmer households are landless in a situation where there still is plenty of arable land available 
(Kasian 2006: 28). In reality Thaksin only paid lip service to the ideas of sufficiency and self-
reliance, “his economic policies and his true feelings wre clearly diametrically opposed” Pasuk 
and Baker 2004: 129). 
Sufficiency economics with its inward-looking strategy stressing self-reliance at the grassroots 
level and the creation of stronger ties among domestic economic insitutions was the ideological 
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device which acted as oppositional tool to overthrow Thaksin. In fact, it was the accusations 
about corruption and popular support for the notion of sufficiency economics around which a 
considerable number of social movement, NGOs and labor groups against privatization could 
gather and find a common cause against Thaksin (Kasian 2006: 36). As noted by Bello: “Taking 
advantage of the King’s popularity, critics claim that the military-supported government that 
overthrew Thaksin is cleverly using the sufficiency economy to legitimize its rule. Whatever the 
case, globalization is an unpopular word in Thailand today” (Bello 2007). 
Concluding remarks 
Although it is to early to review or evaluate the Thaksin Shinawatra government’s virtues there is 
no doubt that it became symbol of resistance and a nationalist backlash against IMF 
conditionalities and forced deregulation and privatization.  During the first election campaign 
Thaksin and the TRT devoted much concern for the plights of the poor and a harsh critique of 
Chuan Leekpai and the Democrats= giving in to neoliberal demands from the IFI´s - the claim 
was being made that they had sold the country to foreigners and devastated domestic business. It 
is also noteworthy that Thaksin insisted and repaid Thailand’s IMF loans ahead of schedule in 
July 2003. A step partly motivated by earning political points (Ito 2007: 42-43). 
 
On the question of privatization it is not yet clear whether the resistance made by the Thaksin 
government against demands from the IMF and World Bank was based on a genuine policy shift 
or on protection of domestic vested interests. Some observers note that the very reason for 
Thaksin’s entrance into politics was a matter of “commercial survival” and because of the effects 
of the crisis leading capitalists “needed the state” (Baker 2005: 111-112). In 2001, Hewison 
noted ATRT may be expected to slow liberalisation in some areas. The party may rollback some 
changes to laws, and to give an >edge= back to domestic business. That Thaksin is populist is an 
advantage as the pacification of the class struggle through a credit-sustained boom has been 
demonstrated in Thailand, and the threat of unrest of the kind seen in Indonesia is a worry for 
business@ (Hewison 2001d: 18). Thai businessmen have took key positions in the cabinet and it 
quickly turned out that Thaksin attempted to control everything from the courts, the media, and 
in the end he made a huge miscalculations when he tried to manipulate the reshuffle of the army 
commander. The last move probably spelled the end for Thaksin because if he had succeeded he 
would have controlled the entire country’s polity. The big question now is whether the military 
junta is repeating the same policies of which they accused Thaksin. In fact he was probably not 
greedier than his predecessors. He continued the privatization drive with even more speed than 
previous governments – military as well as civilian – and this in the usual Thai-style crony and 
nepotistic way. The major difference was that he did have an eye for the rural masses and he did 
continue the Keynesian demand-management policies which started under Chuan Leekpai. 
   
In the aftermath of the financial crisis there was suddenly much talk in the media about the need 
for social policies and even the IFIs urged the governments in the region to establish social 
welfare states of a kind. Obviously they feared instability and that grave political and social 
consequences, in a worst case scenario, would set foreign investment in jeopardy and this would 
spell the end of the EOI growth model. What was at stake was the growth model without social 
welfare of the >Washington Consensus= and suddenly the same proponents of neo-classical and 
neo-liberal development strategies saw themselves in the awkward and contradictory situation 
arguing for the opposite of two decades doctrinaire economic policy recommendations. This U-
turn in IFI conditionality had a notable impact on the Thai debate with regard to economic and 
social policy. 
 
 
 22 
Advocates on both left and right have relied on the idea that, >civil society= can replace the role of 
the state. The basic argument in this paper is that >civil society= at least in its mainstream 
understanding cannot replace the state, but should make a greater effort into pressurizing the state 
to take up basic responsibilities and enhance developmental and regulatory state capacities in 
accordance with its level of development. AThere is great danger that the current overemphasis on 
>civil society= detracts or hijacks the focus away from what is of immediate importance in any 
country with high levels of poverty, inequality and social crisis. If >civil society= includes social 
groupings and strata like organized labour and the peasantry it makes sense as recent examples 
have shown that the labour movement has been relatively successful in pushing for the Social 
Security Act despite resistance from the entrenched politico-business alliance@ (Schmidt 2002). 
In fact the experience with Thaksin and now a military dictatorship show the weakness of Thai 
civil society and also various factions’ attempt to incorporate sufficiency economics as a 
progressive force in Thai society. 
 
Against this background it is important to note that social safety nets cannot, realistically, be 
constructed in a short time perspective. Similarly, measures such as attempts to save viable 
enterprises and active labour market policies can achieve only limited results when they go 
against the grain of macroeconomic conditions, and mixed signals from the international realm. 
With a weak >civil society= and a non-responsive state which Acannot cope with demands, due to 
lack of resources or loopholes in the welfare system, there will be widespread social problems, 
discontent, and instability@ (Chan 2001: 31). But if the scope of social policy is to promote 
limited, individualized and temporary social safety nets; thus the current focus on poverty 
programs per se distracts attention from its two main dimensions: employment and income 
policies and other social programs besides health, education and social welfare, such as pensions, 
housing and subsidies to basic consumption; finally, as a consequence redistribution of land, 
income and resources disappear from the intellectual and political agenda. In this context the 
current move by the IFIs and business can be interpreted as a conscious way to promote 
ideological hegemony by distracting the real issues from the domestic and international policy 
and social agenda and this was also the case with Thaksin. His populist social policy spending 
programmes were simply a way to buy votes and enhance his electoral base in rural 
constituencies. 
 
Related to this discussion, the Thai scholar and activist Ungpakorn argues that the Thai working 
class has been, and continues to be, an agent for social and political change (Husan 2001). 
According to him the aim of the NGOs is Ato channel worker discontent away from strikes and 
into constitutional channels to press for social reforms. Rather contradictorily, the NGOs 
supported the 1997 constitution that barred all those not having a university degree from standing 
in parliament.@ The NGOs are advocating a >left nationalist= politics seeking to side with domestic 
capitalists against foreign capital. The NGOs concentrate on trade union leaders rather than the 
rank and file with the aim of setting up national tripartite institutions. @Such a plan, however, 
finds resistance from trade union activists who oppose the strikingly termed >stinking water trade 
union leaders= (named after the famed back street sewage drainage in Bangkok) of which there 
are three types: gangsters, stooges of the security services, and fat cat bureaucrats. This might 
help explain why the union density level is only a little over three percent but, Ungpakorn argues, 
their baleful influence is offset by thriving networks of unofficial activists in >area groups= and 
>coordinating committees=@(Husan 2001). This is partly also the conclusion of Deyo who asks: 
How do we explain the continued political marginalization of popular-sector groups in shaping of 
strategies of reform and crisis management, especially in matter of particular interest to workers? 
In part, the answer lies in political coalitional fragmentation and competition among farmers and 
labor groups together with cooptation by elite groups. However, the more general explanation 
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should be found in four factors: The continuance of existing political constraints, uneven 
strategic rescaling as between labor and capital, intensified economic and structural 
demobilization, and political institutional changes associated with the reforms and crisis@ (Deyo 
2000). One problem is related to the fact that Thai unions operate as representational 
associations, lack legal protection; there is a lack of a shared vision between NGO´s and trade 
unions; unemployment and a weakened bargaining position as a result of the crisis; the lack of 
public debate about common national important development and social policy issues and in 
general the move from public to private and closed elite based circuits of important decisions; 
move away of decision-making power from line-ministries to the Ministry of Finance has 
reduced popular access to the bureaucracy (See Deyo 2000). Furthermore, various studies have 
shown that civil society participation is low and some even claim that it has Abeen Acaptured@ by 
elite-led, if not state-led leadership...Far from being a vanguard, civil society is firmly within the 
mainstream of conventional political discourse.@ (Albritton and Bureekul 2001:18). 
 
Nevertheless, the 1997 financial crisis turned Thais against neoliberal globalization. Even after 
the Thaksin government refocused on stimulating domestic demand through income-support for 
the lower classes in the countryside and the city, “popular sentiment went against free trade. On 
Jan 8, 2006, several thousand Thais tried to storm the building in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where 
negotiations for an FTA (free trade agreement) were taking place between the US and Thailand. 
The negotiations were frozen; indeed, Prime Minister Thaksin’s advocacy of the FTA became 
one of the factors that contributed to his loss of legitimacy and eventually his ouster from power 
in September 2006” (Bello 2007). The King’s first post-crisis speech as quoted above could also 
be interpreted as “a practical anticipation of what had happened in previous, less severe 
downturns – namely, that the burden was passed back to the villages” (Baker 2005: 115). 
 
Globally, flexibility has become the buzzword for dismantling of the welfare state, even of the 
sort of hybrid welfare state in Thailand, but this issue is seemingly being contested from below 
by demands for democratization and social reforms. The debate about social policy in Thailand 
has so far been dominated by those who believe in neoliberal ideology, which essentially is a 
matter of identifying needs, solve problems and create opportunities at the individual level. @The 
causes behind the needs for support are believed to rest overwhelmingly in individuals and sub-
cultural defects and dispositions. Responsibility is deflected from states and national economic, 
administrative and legal organisations to individuals and groups. Little attention is paid to the 
interacting consequences of economic and social change for families, employment, taxation, 
housing, social security and public services@ (Schmidt 2000a: 166). 
 
In conclusion, it should be emphasized that the institutional apparatus through which dialogue on 
the consequences of the crisis of social and economic adjustment could occur is absent. Evidence 
shows that the examples of cooperative labour-management relations are A(i) likely to be in the 
minority, and (ii) slower to diffuse in the absence of a well-developed trade union movement@ 
(ILO 1998 cf Schmidt 2002). Given this background it would be wrong to describe Thaksin’s 
policy as either new or old Keynesianism. It was rather a short term temporary pro-active policy 
to ride the storm and to avoid turmoil. A new type of import-substitution is probably emerging, 
but it can easily survive side by side with the emphasis on exports. One consequence common to 
both the privatization drive of state enterprises and all three social policy sectors are Athe 
increasing role of the private sector in the provision and/or financing of social programmes. 
Provision by non-state actors is portrayed as being more efficient and even moral, whereas 
provision by bureaucratic organisations is described as expensive and fostering welfare 
dependency@ (Ramesh 2000: 181).  
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As a post festum it is indeed necessary to stress the need for more policy research to assess the 
validity of assumptions that underlie market-oriented reforms, and the options for, and 
constraints on, development of efficient and equitable public health, education and social policy 
sectors. Furthermore, there is daring need for more research into the deep rooted causes of 
poverty and inequality which in most cases can be removed only by structural interventions such 
as land reforms and other types of redistribution, educational expansion and reforms of state 
institutions and credit systems. 
 
Bibliography 
 
Albritton, Robert B. and Thawilwadee Bureekul (2001) The Role of Civil Society in Thai 
Electoral Politics, Paper for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Boston, August 28-September 2. 
Asher, Mukul G. (1995) Social Security Systems a Regional Challenge, Bangkok Post 18 May. 
Assavanond, Anjira and Achara Achayakachart (1999) Severino: Crisis has silver lining, 
Bangkok Post 23. January. 
Assavanonda, Anjira (2000) Simplistic approach to complex social problems, Bangkok Post, 4. 
November. 
Baker, Chris (2005) Pluto-populism. Thaksin and popular politics, in Peter Warr (ed.), Thailand 
beyond the Crisis, RoutledgeCurzon. 
Bechstedt, Hans-Dieter (1991) Identity and Authority in Thailand, in Craig J. Reynolds, National 
Identity and Its Defenders, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai. 
Bell, Peter F. (2001) The Asian Economic Crisis and the Future of Asian Capitalism, Critical 
Asian Studies, 33:3. 
Bello, Walden  (2007) All fall down: 10 years after the Asian financial crisis. 27 July. 
http://www.focusweb.org/all-fall-down-ten-years-after-the-asian-financial crisis.html?Itemid=92 
Bello, Walden (2003) The Multiple Crises of Global Capitalism, Canadian Dimension 
January/February. 
Bienefeld, Manfred (1993) Financial Deregulation: Disarming the Nation State, Studies in 
Political Economy, 37, Spring 
Brecher, Jeremy and Tim Costello (2001) End of the Global Gilded Age, ZNet 
Commentary,November 28,   http://www.zmag.org/. 
Brown, Andrew and Stephen Frenkel (1995) Union Unevenness and Insecurity in Thailand, in 
Stephen Frenkel, Organized Labour in the Asia-Pacific Region, ILR Press, New York. 
Chan, Raymond K.H. (2001) The Welfare System in Southeast asia: Development and 
Challenges,  SEARC Working Paper Series No. 13, City University of Hong Kong. 
Cheng, Maria (2001) Enterprise: Health Care: Inside the battle for Asia's sick rich, Asiaweek, 
Hong Kong, November 16. 
Chotigeat, T. and J Barry Lin (2001) Coping with the 1997 financial crisis: Policy issues in 
Southeast-Asia, Multinational Business Review; Detroit; Fall. 
Connors, Michael  Kelly (2001) Ideological Aspects of Democratization in Thailand: 
Mainstreaming Localism, SEARC Working Paper Series No. 12, City University of Hong Kong. 
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea and Sanjay Reddy (2001) The Impact of Adjustment-Related Social 
Funds on Income and Poverty, United Nations University, WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2001/1, 
May. 
Crispin, Shawn W. (2001) Patriot games, Far Eastern Economic Review, November 1. 
Crispin, Shawn W. (2001) Power politics trump reform, Far Eastern Economic Review, 
September 27. 
Deyo, Fred (2000) Reform, Globalization and Crisis: Restructuring Thai Labor, Journal of 
Industrial Relations (Australia) Vol 42 no. 2 
 
 25 
Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER) (2001) Editorial, November 27. 
Farelly, Nicholas (2007) Royal Shadows in the Land of Smiles, The Oxonian Review of Books, 
vol.6, issue 2, Spring. 
Glassman, Jim (2007) Commentary, Environment and Planning A. Vol. 39. 
Glassman, Jim (2003) The Spaces of Economic Crisis: Asia and the Reconfiguration of Neo-
Marxist Crisis Theory, Studies in Comparative International Development, Winter, Vol. 37, No. 
4. 
Gray, John (2001) The era of globalization is over, New Statesman 24 September. 
Handley, Paul M. (2006) The King Never Smiles. A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumipol 
Adulyadej, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2006. 
Handley, Paul M. (2006b) Who get the kingdom’s sceptre when Bhumipol leaves the stage; Asia 
Sentinel 06 November. 
Hewison, Kevin (2001a) Liberalism and Globalization,   SEARC Working Paper Series No. 15, 
City University of Hong Kong. 
Hewison, Kevin (2001b) Thailand: Class Matters, SEARC Working Paper Series No. 8, City 
University of Hong Kong. 
Hewison, Kevin (2001c) Nationalism, Populism, Dependency: Old Ideas for a New Southeast 
Asia?, SEARC Working Paper Series No.4, City University of Hong Kong. 
Hewison, Kevin (2001d) Pathways to Recovery: Bankers, Business and Nationalism in Thailand , 
 SEARC Working Paper Series No.1, City University of Hong Kong.  
http://www1.worldbank.org/edinvest.Husan, Rumy (2001) Review of Ji Ungpakorn Thailand, 
Class Struggle in an Era of Economic Crisis Hong Kong: Asia Monitor Resources Center, 1999. 
Capital & Class, London, autumn. 
ILO (1998) Social Responses to the Financial Crisis in East and South-East Asian Countries, 
Geneva. 
Ito, Takatoshi (2007) Asian Currency Crisis and the International monetary Fund, 10 years later: 
Overview, Asian Economic Policy Review, No.2. 
Kasian Tejapira (2006) Toppling Thaksin, New Left Review, 39 May/June. 
Khor, Martin (2001) Speech at the International Policy Dialogue on Ownership and 
Conditionality (Relating to IMF policies), Berlin, 11-12 June. 
Kristof, Nicholas D. and Sheryl WuDunn (1999) World´s Markets, None of Them an Island, New 
York Times, February 17. 
Lambert, Rob and Donella Caspersz (1995) International Labour Standards: Challenging 
Globalization Ideology? The Pacific Review, Vol. 8, No. 4. 
Landler, Mark (2001)Their Financial Crisis Past, Thais Remain Disillusioned; Harsh I.M.F. 
Remedies Stir Go-It-Alone Attitude, New York Times  June 26. 
Li, Xing, Jacques Hersh and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt (2001) The New Asian Drama: 
Catching-up at the Crossroads of Neoliberalism, in Pietro P. Masina (ed.) Rethinking 
Development in East Asia: From the miracle mythology to the economic crisis, Curzon Press and 
Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, London & Copenhagen. 
Liu, Henry C.K. (2007) Liquidity boom and looming crisis, Asia Times, 9 May. 
Looney, Robert (2003) Thailand's Thaksinomics: A New Asian Paradigm?, Strategic Insight, 
Center for Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, California, December 2. 
Matichon (1997) Look beyond finance sector, in Bangkok Post August 27. 
McCargo, Duncan (2007) A Hollow Crown, New Left Review, 43, Janauary/February. 
McCargo, Duncan (2006) Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand, The Pacific 
Review, vol.18, no.4, December. 
McCargo, Duncan (ed) (2002) Reforming Thai Politics, Curzon Press, Richmond and London. 
McFarlane, Bruce (2001) Annual World Bank Conference of Development Economists 1998 / 
Exchange Rate Policies in Emerging Asian Countries. Review of "Annual World Bank 
 
 26 
Conference of Development Economists 1998" by Boris Pleskovic and Joseph Stiglitz  
"Exchange Rate Policies In Emerging Asian Countries" by S. Collignon, Jean Pisani-Ferry and 
Yun Chue Park. Journal of Contemporary Asia; Manila. 
Multinational Monitor (2000) Unravelling the Washington consensus: An interview with Joseph 
Stiglitz, April. 
Mydans, Seth(1997) Thailand Economic Crash Crushes Working Poor, New York Times, 
December 15. 
NESDB (2007) http://poverty.nesdb.go.th/poverty_new/doc/research/uan_25490928042311.pdf 
Pasuk Phongpaichit (2005) Developing Social Alternatives. Walking backwards into a khlong, in 
Peter Warr (ed.), Thailand beyond the Crisis, RoutledgeCurzon. 
Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker (2004) Thaksin. The Business of Politics in Thailand, NIAS 
Nordi Institute of Asian Studiesm Copenhagen. 
Piriyarangsan, Sunsidh  and Kanchada Poonpanich (1994) Labour institutions in an export-
oriented country. A case study of Thailand, in Gerry Rodgers (ed.), Workers, Institutions and 
Economic Growth in Asia, ILO, Geneva. 
Pouaree, Suvicha (1997) The winners and losers from privatization, Bangkok Post September 21. 
Phongpaicit, Pasuk and Chris Baker (1998) Thailand=s Boom and Bust, Silkworm Books, Chiang 
Mai. 
Preston, Robert (2001) War on Terror: The Economy, New Statesman, 1 October. 
Ramesh M. with Mukul G. Asher (2000)  Welfare Capitalism in Southeast Asia. Social security, 
health and education policies, Macmillan, Houndmills, Basingstoke. 
Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek (2002) Democratization and Social Welfare in Thailand, in 
Duncan McCargo (ed.) Reforming Thai Politics, Curzon Press, Richmond and London. 
Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek (2001) No Middle-road Capitalism, Paper for the International 
Studies Association 42dn Annual Conference 20-24 February 2001, Chicago AInternational 
Relations and the New Inequality. Power, Wealth, and the Transformation of Global Society at 
the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century@. Presented at the Panel A Globalization and the 
Politics of Resistance 
Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek (2000a) Globalization, Democratization and Social Welfare in 
Thailand, in Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt and Jacques Hersh (eds.), Globalization and Social 
Change, Routledge, London and New York. 
Schmidt, Johannes Dragsbaek (2000b) Restructuring Social Welfare in East and Southeast Asia - 
Corporatism with or without labor, in  Korean Social Security Association, Flexibility  vs. 
Security? Social Policy and the Labor Market in Europe and East Asia@ ASEM/ World Bank and 
Korean Social Security Association, Seoul. 
Schuman, Michael (2001) Asia's Slump Could Prove More Persistent Than 1997 Crisis --- 
Weakening Exports to U.S. Kill Region's Chances For V-Shaped Rebound, Wall Street Journal; 
New York, October 24. 
Sirilaksana Khoman (2005) Education. The key to long-term recovery, in Peter Warr (ed.) 
Thailand Beyond the Crisis, RoutledgeCurzon. 
Sirithaveeporn, Wichit (1998) IMF wary of social security expansion, Bangkok Post 13 
November. 
Stiglitz, Joseph (2000) The Insider: What I learned at the World Economic Crisis, The New 
Republic, 17. April. 
Supachai, Panitchpakdi(2001) Include China in Afta, The Nation, Bangkok, 29 June. 
Unarat, Suebpong (1997) Ministry rules out amendment, Bangkok Post, 6. August. 
UNRISD (2000) Globalization and Social Policy: The Threat to Equitable Welfare, Occasional 
paper no. 5. Author Bob Deacon, Geneva 
Whitehead, Margaret, Goran Dahigren, Timothy Evans (2001) Equity and health reforms: Can 
low-income countries escape the medical poverty trap? The Lancet, London, 8. September. 
 
 27 
World Bank (1995) Priorities and strategies for education cf Laurence Kalaftidès, Education on 
the Ropes, The Ecologist, 2001, vol. 31, No. 9. 
World Bank (2007) Thailand Economic Monitor, April 2007, World Bank Office,  Bangkok, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/Economicmonitor/2007april_tem
_report.pdf 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
